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Optimal Timing of Environmental Policy; Interaction Between
Environmental Taxes and Innovation Externalities
Summary
This paper addresses the impact of endogenous technology through research and
development (R&D) and learning by doing (LbD) on the timing of environmental
policy. We develop two models, the first with R&D and the second with LbD. We study
the interaction between environmental taxes and innovation externalities in a dynamic
economy and prove policy equivalence between the second-best R&D and the LbD
model. Our analysis shows that the difference found in the literature between optimal
environmental policy in R&D and LbD models can partly be traced back to the set of
policy instruments available, rather than being directly linked to the source of
technological innovation. Arguments for early action in LbD models carry over to a
second-best R&D setting. We show that environmental taxes should be high compared
to the Pigouvian levels when an abatement industry is developing. We illustrate our
analysis through numerical simulations on climate change policy.
Keywords: Environmental Policy, Technological Change, Research and Development,
Learning by Doing
JEL Classification: H21, O30, Q42
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the coming decades radical policy interventions are necessary to bring a halt to the
continuing increase in the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations when the aim is
to prevent a potentially dangerous anthropogenic interference with the global climate
system, see, e.g., Stern Review (2007). Though most scientists agree on the need for
some abatement in the coming decades, there is a debate on whether the major share
of these efforts should be pursued from the beginning, or whether the largest share of
abatement efforts should be delayed to the future. Three reasons stand out among
advocates of delayed action. First, due to the discounting of future costs, saving our
abatement efforts for the future will allow us to increase our efforts considerably at
the same net present costs. Second, delaying emission reduction efforts will allow us
to emit larger cumulative amounts of greenhouse gases, and thus to abate less in total,
due to the natural depreciations of the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.
Third, delaying abatement efforts will allow us to benefit from cheaper abatement
options that are available in the future, and also to develop these options through
innovation. The first two arguments have taken firm ground in the literature, thanks to
– among others – the analysis by Wigley et al. (1996).2 The third argument, however,
based on presumed technological advancements in abatement options, has raised a
lively debate among economists studying technological change in relation to
environmental policy.
There are arguments for accelerating abatement efforts rather than delaying
them. Energy system analyses have clear empirical evidence for so-called experience
curves suggesting that new low-carbon energy technologies, which will define the
major long-term options for carbon dioxide emission reduction, need to accumulate
experience for costs to come down sufficiently to make these technologies
competitive.3 Based on these experience curves, the more general argument is made
that there is a need for up-front investment in abatement technologies to make them
available at low prices, and thus, technological change would warrant early abatement
action rather than a delay (Ha-Duong et al., 1997; Grübler and Messner, 1998; van der
Zwaan et al., 2002; Kverndokk and Rosendahl, 2006). Models exploring the
experience curves are typically referred to as learning by doing (LbD) models.4 Many
energy system models add another reason for a smooth transition towards clean
energy supply, which is that diffusion of new technologies need the turnover of all
existing vintages and therefore takes a considerable time (Knapp, 1999). A too rapid
switch of the capital stock towards an entirely new technology is considered
unrealistic (Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2004; Rivers and Jaccard, 2006).
Objections have been raised to these arguments. Though experience and
diffusion curves have a strong empirical basis, many economists consider it a
mechanistic view on technological development hiding the incentive-based structures
that determine the level of research efforts by innovators. They prefer models with an
explicit treatment of research and development (R&D) as the engine of innovation,
and they have found that modelling innovations through R&D can lead to potentially
2

They used these arguments to make the case that emission paths developed by the IPCC (1995) for
ceiling atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations tended to put too much effort up-front, while a
delayed abatement response would be more cost-efficient.
3
See Lieberman (1984) for an early contribution focused on the chemical industry, and Isoard and
Soria (2001) for a recent empirical analysis for energy technologies.
4
Manne and Richels (2004), however, find that LbD has almost no effect on the efficient timing of
abatement.
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very different outcomes on optimal timing of abatement policy. An important
difference between LbD and R&D models is that the latter category of models does
not assume from the outset that the technology needs to be used for its costs to fall.
Thus, through R&D, future cheap abatement options may be made available without
the need to use these abatement options while costs are still high. In an R&D model, it
is then most efficient to focus mainly on R&D in the early stages of abatement policy,
without employing the technologies, and to apply them only after the costs have
sufficiently come down. Indeed, Goulder and Mathai (2000) found this pattern as an
optimal environmental policy and they concluded that whereas LbD may warrant an
advance of using abatement technologies compared to a situation without
technological change, the presence of R&D unambiguously implies a delay in the use
of such technologies.
The first objective of this paper is to test the robustness of Goulder and
Mathai’s finding in a second-best context, i.e., when we have several imperfections,
but insufficient policy instruments available to correct them all. Caution is needed
when results depend on first-best assumptions, since such a first-best innovationabatement solution can be reached only when policy makers have a rich instrument
set available. If R&D suffers from market imperfections, they need to be able to
directly target environmental R&D, separately from abatement efforts. That is, policy
makers need to have a tailored instrument available to bring environmental R&D
efforts to their socially optimal level. In contrast, we assume that policy makers may
use a common R&D instrument such as R&D subsidies over all sectors, and a generic
environmental instrument such as environmental taxes to target environmental goals.
Since environmental R&D makes up only a small portion of economy-wide R&D
expenditures, we next consider the R&D subsidies as exogenous to the environmental
policy problem, and consequently, the policy maker has to rely on one instrument, say
the environmental tax, to steer both abatement levels and environment-specific R&D
efforts. Since now the environmental tax affects both abatement efforts and
innovation within the abatement sector, the functioning of the innovation market
within the environmental sector, i.e., how the gap between private and social returns
on R&D develops, becomes of crucial importance for determining the efficient level
of the environmental tax. If the R&D distortion is largest during the phase of a fast
increase in abatement efforts, this will have some impact on the efficient path of the
environmental tax.
For our study we develop an R&D model in line with the endogenous growth
literature and assume that R&D efforts are based on market-based incentives through
patents. Patents protect the holders from others directly using their innovation in
production, but at the same time, patents disclose the knowledge base underlying the
innovation, which then can be used by rivals to develop substitute technologies. Also,
patents have a finite lifetime and expire after a certain period. These properties can
lead to intricate connections between R&D dynamics and environmental policy (cf.
Encaoua and Ulph, 2004), and we need to see how they alter the first-best timing
results.
We expect that the gap between an LbD model and a second-best R&D model
with finite lifetime of patents will be considerably narrowed. Whereas in a first-best
R&D model it is possible that innovators develop new technologies and continually
improve these without the need to be used in production, in a second-best R&D model
with finite patent lifetime, innovations will only occur when they are used in
production before the patent’s expiration date. This mechanism is similar to the
mechanism in LbD models, where technology only advances if it is used. Thus, the
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representation of finite lifetime of patents in an R&D model will lead to the required
use of abatement technologies in earlier periods so that innovators can earn back the
costs of R&D.
The argument above makes clear that a finite patent lifetime creates an
appropriation problem for innovators who cannot fully capture the social value of
their innovations in the long future. Many R&D models incorporate the idea that
innovators cannot appropriate the full value of their innovations – Nordhaus (2002),
Popp (2004) and Gerlagh and Lise (2005) make precise assumptions on this. But
whereas in the broad innovation literature the finite lifetime of patents is a common
reason for this feature (for an early contribution, see Nordhaus, 1969), in the
environmental economics literature, the time dimension of the appropriation problem
is mostly neglected. If the appropriation gap would be a constant fraction of the social
value (as assumed in these models), then a constant innovation subsidy would be
sufficient to correct for this market failure. If, however, patents expire, innovations
will be biased towards technologies that pay back within the patent’s lifetime, while
there is no incentive to develop and improve technologies whose value lies in the
farther future. A generic R&D subsidy cannot correct for this timing dimension of the
appropriation problem, and instead, a complementary environmental policy may be
required for its correction.
This paper is organised in the following way. In Section 2 we develop a partial
model for abatement and environmental quality, which for instance can be interpreted
as climate change. The model has discrete time steps, and technological change is
driven by the Romer (1987) type of endogenous growth through increasing varieties,
based on the ‘love of variety’ concept (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Subsequently, we
develop an LbD model.
We analyse optimal environmental policies in Section 3, starting with a firstbest setting as in Hartman and Kwon (2005) and Bramoulle and Olson (2005, cf
Proposition 8). Then we consider the second-best setting, for which we analyse the
development over time of efficient environmental taxes relative to Pigouvian taxes.
As in Hart (2006), our timing analysis focuses on the transition paths for both R&D
and LbD models, where the abatement sector is rapidly increasing in size, and slowly
becomes mature characterised by a lower growth rate. Different from Goulder and
Mathai (2000), the timing analysis is not based on a comparison of multiple scenarios,
e.g. one with and another one without endogenous technological change.5 Instead, we
analyse the development over time of research subsidies and the gap between efficient
environmental taxes and Pigouvian taxes in the first- and second-best setting. The
relative gap between the two taxes tells us something about the relative stringency of
environmental policy compared to the social cost of pollution, and we are particularly
interested in its development over time.
Our focus on the gap between efficient environmental and Pigouvian taxes
puts our analysis in a broad strand of literature. Much of this literature focused on tax
interaction effects (c.f. Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994) and it raised lively debates in
5

As Pade and Greaker (2006) point out, the comparison made by Goulder and Mathai (2000) is
problematic in the sense that their ETC scenario assumes technological change in addition to the
benchmark (no-ETC) scenario. The scenario with ETC therefore has a more optimistic path of falling
abatement costs compared to the scenario without ETC. Thus, the comparison between the two
scenarios is mainly driven by the difference in technology paths, and is largely independent of the
source of technological change, be it endogenous or exogenous. Though our set up is not directly
comparable with Goulder and Mathai (2000), our broader context is comparable as both study the
relation between sources of innovation (R&D vs. LbD) and timing of action.
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policy circles when it explored the potential for so-called double dividends. In
addition to tax interaction, reasons for a divergence between efficient environmental
and Pigouvian taxes include trade effects (Hoel, 1996), scale effects in production
(Liski, 2002), and, more recently, the processes underlying technological change.
Rosendahl (2004) shows that in an LbD model, the environmental tax should be
higher than a Pigouvian tax, with the largest gap for those countries and sectors that
generate most of the learning. In a similar fashion, Golombek and Hoel (2005,
Proposition 9) show that in an environmental treaty the optimal carbon price can
exceed the Pigouvian level when abatement targets lead to innovation and
international technology spillovers that are not internalised in domestic policies.6 Our
paper studies the dynamics of this gap between efficient and Pigouvian environmental
taxes, in relation to endogenous technological change.
After the separate analyses of the R&D and LbD models, in Section 4 we
compare the two models and present conditions under which the two models have
identical efficient policy paths. That is, we establish conditions for policy equivalence
between the second-best R&D model and the LbD model.
Finally, in Section 5 we carry out some numerical calculations to illustrate the
analysis and to investigate its substance. Throughout the simulations, the model
parameters are chosen to reflect the common climate change context. Section 6
concludes.

2. MODEL SET UP
We consider an economy where there are concerns for the environment due to stock
pollution. This could for instance be climate change, caused by carbon dioxide
emissions following from the combustion of fossil fuels. More generally, we assume a
benchmark emission path and a demand for abatement of emissions because of
environmental considerations.
Let θt and τt reflect the social marginal cost and the policy-induced market cost
(e.g., environmental tax) of emission at time t, respectively. The social cost and the
market cost may differ as the first reflects the pure pollution externality problem (and
is often referred to as the Pigouvian tax), while the second is dependent on the policy
measures applied and the structure of the economy. In the following, we are interested
in studying the dynamic relations between θt and τt in first- and second-best settings,
i.e., how does the market cost deviate from the social marginal cost under different
assumptions about knowledge dynamics (R&D vs. LbD) and policy measures
available.
The abatement sector in the R&D model
The model of research and development (R&D) is based on Romer’s endogenous
growth model (Romer, 1987, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). The model has an
infinite horizon with discrete time steps, t = 1,…,∞. There is one representative
abatement sector, which could either be interpreted as an alternative, emission-free
resource sector (e.g. renewables or fossil fuels supplemented with carbon capturing
and sequestration), or as abatement of emissions. There are Ht producers of abatement
equipment at each point of time t, and an R&D sector producing new ideas or
6

The analysis by Golombek and Hoel (2005) is in a game-theoretic context, and the result depends on
the instrument used to define the treaty (compare Proposition 9 and 10).
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innovations. Technological progress takes the form of expansion in the number of
abatement equipment varieties. The producers of the abatement equipment own
patents and, therefore, receive monopoly profits. However, they have to buy the
innovations from the R&D sector, where innovators are competitive and use research
effort as an input. We assume that patents last for one period, and so innovations are
public goods thereafter. Hence, there are positive spillovers to innovation from the
previous-period stock of innovations (standing on shoulders). Also, we assume
negative externalities from aggregate current research through crowding out of
research effort. Thus, in this model there are three imperfections related to
innovations; too little production of abatement equipment due to monopolistic
competition, positive spillovers of the earlier period innovation stock on new
innovations, and negative spillovers of total research effort on new innovations. Thus,
the market outcome of innovations may exceed or fall short of the social optimal
level.
Let E be emissions of the stock pollutant, Y is benchmark emissions without
any environmental policies, while A is abatement. If we think of energy and CO2
emissions, Y could be total energy demand, while A could either be renewable (CO2free) energy that partly replaces fossil fuels in consumption and production, or a
reduction in the emissions from fossil fuel combustion, e.g., through carbon capture
and storage. Thus, total emissions are as follows:7
Et = Yt – At.

(1)

Production of abatement requires intermediate flow inputs Zt, and the input xi of
abatement equipments, where subscript i∈[0,H t ] refers to the variety, and Ht is the
number of equipment varieties. Ht can be interpreted as the state of knowledge.
H

α
t
γ
At = B Zt (∫0 x βt , i di) .

(2)

B is a constant and 0<β<1, 0<α<1, 0<γ<1. Furthermore, we demand α+βγ≤1, where
a strict inequality implies that there is a fixed factor in production, e.g., due to site
scarcity for renewables. The presence of a fixed factor implies that the value of output
is strictly larger than the value of all variable inputs. In that case we can specify B as
B=cF1–α–βγ, where F is the fixed factor and c is a constant, such that the total value of
output is fully attributed to all inputs Z, xi, and F.
The different abatement equipments are neither direct substitutes nor direct
complements to other specific equipments. That is, the marginal product of each
abatement equipment is independent of the quantity of any particular equipment, but
depends on the total input of all other equipment varieties together. Since all varieties
have the same production costs and decreasing marginal product, in equilibrium the
same quantity will be employed of each equipment. Thus, assuming that the
equipments can be measured in a common physical unit, we can write x i =X/H, where
X is the aggregate input of abatement equipment. The production identity then
becomes:
α

βγ

( 1 –β) γ

A t = B Zt X t H t

.

(3)

7

The relation between emissions and benchmark emissions is specified as a linear function for
convenience of notation. A more general function would give the same qualitative results. In the
numerical simulations in Section 5, we use a CES aggregation.
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It is clear that the abatement sector has increasing returns to scale when α+γ>1, due
to the technology H.8 Now consider the case where abatement efforts have to increase
over time continually to maintain a clean environment jointly with an increasing
overall economic activity. For α+γ<1, the abatement expenditures will have to
increase more than proportionally with the abatement effort. For α+γ=1, the costs of
abatement rise in proportion with abatement levels. For α+γ>1, the price of
abatement decreases, and total expenditures increase less then the abatement effort.
Assume now that the public agent implements an emission tax τt, or more
generally an environmental policy that induces a market cost of emission, τt. From (1)
we see that this translates into a market price for abatement A t. The abatement
producer’s optimisation problem is:
Ht

Max τ t A t – Z t – ∫0 p t , i x t , i di,

(4)

subject to (2).
The price of Z is set to unity and the price of abatement equipement xt,i is equal
to pt,i. Thus, the abatement producer maximises the value of abatement minus the
abatement costs.
The first order conditions of this maximisation problem determine the
abatement producer’s demand for Z and xi:
Z t = ατ t A t
α Ht
γ-1
β ( 1 –β) - 1
) ]/ p t , i } 1/1-β.
x t , i = {[γβτ t BZt (∫0 x βt , k dk) ]/p t , i } 1/1-β = {[γβτ t A t (X t H t

(5)
(6)

From (5) we see that the costs of Z should equal the share α of the production value,
where α expresses the relative contribution of Z in production.
The demand for x t , i is given by (6). Alternatively, we can also express the
demand for aggregated input of abatement equipment using x i =X/H, and pt,i=pt:
p t X t = βγτ t A t .

(7)

Thus, the demand for abatement equipment is falling in the own price, but increasing
in the environmental tax.
Production of abatement equipment in the R&D model
The producers of abatement equipment own patents and therefore act as monopolists.
Their costs of producing intermediates xt,i are set to unity, and they maximise profits
(or the value of the patent), π t , i , taking into account the falling demand curves for
abatement equipment. For a patent valid for one period, we get the following
maximisation problem:
Max π t , i = x t , i (p t , i –1),

(8)

8

An interesting case arises when γ=1–α. There are decreasing returns to scale for a given
technological level Ht, e.g., due to a fixed factor. This can be understood as the short-term feature of
the model. At the same time, there are constant returns to scale for endogenous level of knowledge.
The technology effect precisely balances the fixed factor effect.
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subject to (6).
The first order condition from maximising (8) with respect to p t , i determines
the price of the abatement equipment:
p t , i = p = 1/β.

(9)

From (7) and (9) we find the market equilibrium of X:
2

X t = β γτ t A t .

(10)

As all varieties are identical (x i =X/H), and prices are equal across varieties, see (9),
the value of a patent is also equal for all innovations, i.e., π t , i =π t . Using this in
addition to (8), (9), (10) and x i =X/H, we find the value of all patents:
π t H t = (1–β)βγτ t A t .

(11)

The innovation process in the R&D sector
The producers of abatement equipment buy patents from innovators that operate in a
competitive market.9 Innovators develop new varieties according to the following
production function:
h t , j = r t , j (H t – 1 /R t )

1–ψ

,

(12)

where rt,j is the research effort of innovator j, ht,j is the number of varieties produced
by this innovator, and we assume 0<ψ<1. Rt denotes aggregated research efforts by all
innovators.
As seen from the production function in (12), and as explained above, there is
a positive externality through a spillover from the previous period knowledge stock
through Ht–1, and a negative externality through crowding out of current research via
Rt.10 We also see that both externalities are higher the lower the value of ψ.
The innovators maximise profit with respect to research effort, where the price
of the innovation equals the monopoly profit of equipment producers, or equivalently
the value of the patent.
Max π t h t , j – r t,j,

(13)

subject to (12).
The price of research effort is set equal to one. First order conditions give that
the unit cost of research (i.e., one) is equal to the value of the patent, π, multiplied by
the productivity of r.
9

Alternatively we could assume that the innovators are producing the abatement equipments, such that
they own the patents and get the monopoly rent. This would not change the arguments or conclusions
of the analysis.
10
Encaoua and Ulph (2004) distinguish between knowledge and technology information flows.
Knowledge flow or knowledge diffusion is equal to ςHt-1, which means that a fraction 0<ς<1 of
previous knowledge is public information at time t. The technology flow is the technology spillover
according to which a technology can be imitated by others, such that a patent does not offer a perfect
protection to its holder. In our model this would mean that χHt will be private property of the patent
holders, where 0<χ<1, while (1-χ)Ht can be copied by others. In our model we assume that both ς and χ
are set to unity.

8
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Due to the zero-profit condition, in equilibrium the value of all patents is equal
to the value of all research effort:
πtHt = Rt.

(14)

Substitution of (14) in (11) and aggregation of (12) give the following two conditions
for research effort and knowledge dynamics in the economy:
R t = (1–β)βγτ t A t
ψ 1–ψ
Ht = Rt Ht –1 .

(15)
(16)

Market equilibrium in the R&D model
The five equations (3), (5), (10), (15) and (16) define a market equilibrium through
the variables At, Zt, Xt, Rt, Ht, for a given environmental tax policy τt.
PROPOSITION 1. For given initial state of knowledge, H0, and tax policy defined by
τt>0, a unique equilibrium path exists if [1–α–βγ–ψγ(1–β)]>0 .
Proof. Substitution of the four equations (5), (10), (15) and (16) into (3) gives:
1–α–βγ–ψγ(1–β)

At

=Bα α γ β γ + ψ γ ( 1 - β ) β

2βγ+ψγ(1–β)

(17)

(1–β)

ψ γ ( 1 – β ) α+βγ+ψγ(1– β ) ( 1 – ψ ) ( 1 – β ) γ
.
τt
H t –1

If [1–α–βγ–ψγ(1–β)]>0, the left hand side is increasing in At from zero without
bound, and the right-hand side is constant at time t. Thus, for given Ht–1 there is a
unique At that solves the equation. Ht is then defined by (15) and (16). By forward
induction, this defines a unique path. Q.E.D.
Note that the unique path essentially requires that there are decreasing returns
to scale within a period t (i.e., with Ht–1 fixed, but not Ht).
Model with LbD
We now present a learning by doing (LbD) model that is comparable to the R&D
model. However, in this model, technological progress takes form of expansion in
knowledge following passively from experience with abatement. Thus, there is no
separate innovation activity in the model. As in the R&D model, there is a positive
spillover from the knowledge stock in the previous period, such that knowledge is a
public good after one period. Because of this externality, the social optimal abatement
level is higher than abatement in the market equilibrium.
Market equilibrium in the LbD model
As before, the model has an infinite horizon with discrete time steps, t=1,…,∞.
Abatement requires intermediate inputs Zt for which a competitive market exists, and
Ht is the state of technology or knowledge.
α

γ

A t = BZt H t ,

(18)

9
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with 0<γ<1, 0<α<1, and B is a constant. The condition α<1 implies that there is a
fixed factor in production. Compared to the abatement production in the R&D model
(see equation (2)), abatement in the LbD model is produced without specific
abatement equipments.
As before, the public agent implements an emission tax τt. The representative
abatement producer is competitive and maximises (with the price of Zt set to unity):
Max τ t A t – Z t ,

(19)

subject to (18).
From profit maximisation we derive the first order condition
Z t = ατ t A t .

(20)

Note that the first order condition for the intermediate input is the same as in the R&D
model, see (5).
Under LbD, knowledge dynamics are given by
ψ

1–ψ

Ht = At Ht –1 .

(21)

The three equations (18), (20), and (21) define a market equilibrium through
the variables At, Zt, Ht.
PROPOSITION 2. For given initial state of knowledge, H0, and a tax path τt >0, a unique
equilibrium path exists if 1–α–ψγ>0 .
Proof. Substitution of (20) and (21) in (18) gives
1–α–ψγ

At

α

α

(1–ψ)γ

= Bα τ t H t – 1

.

(22)

The left-hand-side is increasing in At from zero without bound for 1–α–ψγ>0 , the
right-hand-side is constant at time t. Thus, there is a unique solution At to the
equation. For given Ht–1, this solution determines At, and Ht through (21), such that
the entire equilibrium path can be determined by forward induction. Q.E.D.

3. EFFICIENT POLICY IMPLEMENTATIONS
First-best policy in the R&D model
The social planner aims at minimising the present value of abatement costs plus the
damage from the stock pollutant. This can for instance be interpreted as the damage
from the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere, i.e., the carbon stock. The
minimisation problem becomes (where δ<1 is the social discount factor):
∞

Min Σ 1 δ

t-1

[Z t + R t + X t + D(S t )],

(23)

subject to (1), (3), (16) and stock accumulation dynamics
S t = (1–ε)S t – 1 + E t .

(24)
10
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The social abatement costs are the sum of the costs of Z, R and X, which all have price
equal to 1.
D(S) is the damage cost function, where damage depends on the stock of
emissions, S. We assume that D(S0)≥0, D´(St) > 0 and D´´(St)>0, and that the stock
depreciates by the rate ε<1.
The first order conditions from this minimisation problem are:
Z t = αθ t A t
X t = βγθ t A t
R t = ψη t H t
η t H t = δ(1–ψ)η t + 1 H t + 1 + (1–β)γθ t A t
θ t = D´(S t ) + δ(1–ε)θ t + 1 .

(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)

Note that θ t =–λ t ≥0, where λt is the dual variable for equation (1), and, hence, the
current value shadow price of emissions. As mentioned before, θt is often referred to
as the Pigouvian tax. Note also that θt is equal to the social price (or marginal value)
of abatement in this model, as Et and At are perfect substitutes, and since At has no
effects on knowledge (as it has in the LbD model). η t ≥0 is the dual variable of
equation (16) and, therefore, the current value shadow price of knowledge.
The first order conditions for Z and X defined by (25) and (26), are similar to
the corresponding conditions for the market equilibrium given by (5) and (7), with the
exception that market prices are replaced by the corresponding social prices.
As seen from (27), the value of research should equal the share ψ of the social
value of knowledge. ψ expresses the relative contribution of R in producing
knowledge. Equation (28) shows that the shadow price of knowledge is in general
positive, but equal to 0 if there is no abatement throughout the time horizon.
According to (29), the social cost of emissions at time t, θt, is the present value
of the damages caused by one unit of emission emitted at time t. It follows from a
comparison of (5) and (25) that in the first-best policy, θt is equal to the optimal
emission tax τ t at time t.
As there are three types of imperfections in the model; pollution, imperfect
competition in the market for abatement equipment, and positive and negative
externalities of research effort, we would need three policy instruments to implement
the social optimum: A Pigouvian tax on emissions, a subsidy to producers of
abatement equipment, and a subsidy or tax on research effort.
PROPOSITION 3. Through a tax on emissions equal to the Pigouvian tax, τ t =θ t , a
subsidy on abatement equipment equal to sx,t = 1–β, and a subsidy/tax on R&D
effort equal to sr,t=1–(1–β)γθ t A t /ψη t H t , the first best outcome can be
implemented.
Proof: We introduce three policy instruments to implement the first-best outcome; an
emission tax, τ t , a subsidy on abatement equipment, sx,t, and a subsidy/tax on
research, sr,t. We can then write the market conditions corresponding to (25), (26) and
(27) as
Z t = ατ t A t
(1–s x , t )p t X t = βγτ t A t

(30)
(31)

11
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(1–s r , t )R t = (p t –1) βγτ t A t /(1–s x , t )p t .

(32)

First, equation (30) is equal to the market condition defined in (5). Second, replacing
p t in equation (7) with (1–s x , t )p t , gives the demand for Xt expressed by (31). Finally,
(32) is derived in the same way as equation (11) and (15), apart from that we use (31)
instead of equation (10). The price innovators pay for rt is now set to (1–s r , t ) instead
of unity.
Setting the environmental tax equal to the Pigouvian tax, i.e., τ t =θ t ,
implements the optimal use of Zt, see (25) and (30).
To find the optimal subsidy rate on abatement equipment, sx,t, we first replace
θt for τ t , which gives the following demand for Xt:
(1–s x , t )p t X t = βγθ t A t .

(33)

From (9) we know that p=1/β. Thus, sx,t=1–β implements the optimal use of X, cf.
(26).
Finally, to find the optimal subsidy/tax on research, s r , t , we insert p=1/β from
(9), τ t =θ t and sx,t=1–β in equation (32). The market outcome of R then changes to:
(1–s r , t )R t = (1–β)γθ t A t .

(34)

Inserting the first-best level of R from (27) gives after some calculation:
sr,t = 1 – (1–β)γθ t A t /ψη t H t .
Q.E.D.

(35)

The optimal level of sr,t in equation (35) may be positive or negative. This is because
research effort has both positive and negative external effects.
The development of the research subsidy/tax, sr,t, will depend on the
development of the ratio θ t A t /η t H t , i.e., the social value of abatement relative to the
social value of knowledge, see equation (35). Note that the social value of abatement
is proportional to the abatement expenditure (i.e., Zt+Xt+Rt), as θ t =τ t . To see how this
ratio develops over time, we need some definitions. The abatement expenditure
growth factor is defined as φ t =τ t + 1 A t + 1 /τ t A t . In a mature abatement sector, this
growth factor is constant. For an infant industry, growth will exceed the matured
growth level. When the sector is becoming mature, expenditure growth will gradually
fall from its infant level to its mature level. We define the abatement sector to be
maturing when φ t ≥φ t+1, and constantly maturing when this inequality applies for all
t≥0. We can now state and prove:
PROPOSITION 4. In the R&D model, for a constantly maturing abatement sector, the
efficient R&D subsidy/tax sr,t will fall over time.
Proof: Given (35), it suffices to prove that η t H t /τ t A t decreases over time. Notice that
θ t =τ t . Writing out equation (28) for the entire horizon, we have
2

η t H t /θ t A t = (1–β)γ {1+δ(1–ψ)φt + [δ(1–ψ)] φt φt+1 + …}.

(36)

12
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007

13

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 40 [2007]

GERLAGH, KVERNDOKK, AND ROSENDAHL
It is obvious that when φt is decreasing in t, then when we compare the equation for
η t H t /θ t A t and η t + 1 H t + 1 /θ t + 1 A t + 1 , in the latter equation, each of the terms on the
right-hand side will be smaller, and thus, η t + 1 H t + 1 /θ t + 1 A t + 1 ≤η t H t /θ t A t . Q.E.D.
Second-best policy in the R&D model
Even if the social optimum in principle may be implemented using the appropriate
number of policy instruments, it may be hard to target R&D at the firm level (as long
as R&D effort is not completely undertaken in the public sector). For instance, R&D
is not specified as a separate activity or sector in most national accounts.
Consequently, it is difficult to use instruments such as a subsidy to producers of
abatement equipment and a subsidy/tax on research effort. Based on this, we specify a
second-best optimum, where the social planner has only one policy instrument
available, namely the environmental tax.
The second-best optimisation problem of the social planner is, therefore, the
minimisation problem (23) subject to (1), (3), (16), and (24), but also subject to the
market equilibrium for Z, R and X given by equations (5), (10) and (15). The social
planner now sets the value of τt that minimises social costs subject to the functioning
of the environmental stock, the technology stock, and the different markets.
We can solve this social optimisation problem by substitution. In combination
with (5), equations (10) and (15) give
2

X t = (β γ/α)Z t
R t = ((1–β)βγ/α)Z t .

(37)
(38)

Substitution of (37) and (38) in (23), (3), and (16) give
∞

Min Σ 1 δ

t-1

[wZ t + D(S t )],

(39)

subject to (1), (24), and
α+ β γ

( 1 –β) γ

A t = CZt H t
ψ 1–ψ
Ht = K Zt Ht –1 ,

(40)
(41)

2

2

βγ

where w=1+β γ/α+(1–β)βγ/α=1+βγ/α>0, C=B(β γ/α) >0 and K=((1–
ψ
β)βγ/α) >0.
As before, let θ t be the Pigouvian tax, so that λ t =–θ t ≤0 is the dual variable for
equation (1). Let ηt be the dual variable for equation (41). The first order condition for
Zt and the optimal level of Ht are given by
wZ t = (α+βγ)θt A t + ψη t H t
η t H t = δ(1–ψ)η t + 1 H t + 1 + (1–β)γθ t A t .

(42)
(43)

In addition, equation (29) carries over from the first-best solution. While equation
(43) is equal to the corresponding equation (28) in the first-best solution, the first
order condition for Z is different due to the restrictions on the use of policy
instruments (compare (42) with (25)).
From (5) and (42) and inserting for w, we derive

13
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τ t /θ t = 1 + [ψ/(α + βγ)] η t H t /θ t A t .

(44)

This formula calculates the efficient second-best environmental tax relative to the
Pigouvian tax on basis of the constant parameters α, β, γ, ψ, w, and the ratio of the
value of knowledge over the value of abatement, η t H t /θ t A t . As we see from (44),
τ t /θ t >1, which means that the efficient environmental tax will be higher than the
Pigouvian tax. This is stated in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 5. In the second-best R&D model, the efficient environmental tax, τt, will
always be higher than the Pigouvian tax, θt, as long as abatement is positive.
Will τ t /θ t rise or fall over time? As seen from (44), this depends on the
development in the ratio of the value of knowledge over the value of abatement, i.e.,
η t H t /θ t A t . This means that the development in τ t /θ t follows a similar path as the
development in the optimal subsidy/tax on research, see (35). Thus, without the
possibility to target research effort, the difference between the efficient emission tax
and the Pigouvian tax should mimic the development in the optimal research
subsidy/tax. This gives the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 6. In the second-best R&D model, for a constantly maturing abatement
sector, the relative difference between the efficient environmental tax, τt, and
the Pigouvian tax, θt, will fall over time.
Proof. From (5) and (42), we calculate a slight deviation from (44),
θ t /τ t = 1 – [ψ/(α + βγ)]η t H t /τ t A t ].

(45)

It suffices to prove that η t H t /τ t A t decreases over time, which follows the same
argument as the proof of Proposition 4. Q.E.D.
Optimal policy in the LbD model
The social planner aims at minimising the present value of abatement costs plus the
damage from the stock pollution, where δ<1 is the social discount factor:
∞

Min Σ 1 δ

t-1

[Z t + D(S t )],

(46)

subject to (1), (18), (21) and (24). The first order conditions from this minimisation
problem are:
Z t = αθ t A t + αψη t H t
η t H t = [δ(1–ψ)/(1–ψγ)]η t + 1 H t + 1 + [γ/(1–ψγ)]θ t A t
θ t = D´(S t ) + δ(1–ε)θ t + 1 .

(47)
(48)
(49)

As before, θ t ≥0 is the Pigouvian tax or the current value shadow cost of emissions,
and η t ≥0 is the current value shadow price on knowledge. The dynamics of the
Pigouvian tax is the same in the two different models, as the dynamics of the pollutant
14
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is the same. Also, even if the value of knowledge does not have the same dynamics in
the two models, it follows a similar pattern, see (28) and (48).
While research effort creates knowledge in the R&D model, the use of the
input Z creates learning and, therefore, knowledge in the LbD model. As opposed to
the first order condition for Z in the R&D model, see (25), we see that in the LbD
model, the value of knowledge has an impact on the optimal use of Z.
There are two imperfections in the LbD model: pollution and spillovers from
knowledge. As knowledge follows from abatement, and abatement affects pollution,
only one policy instrument is needed to implement the social optimum, i.e., a tax on
emissions (or alternatively a subsidy on abatement). Therefore, the first-best solution
and the second-best solution (with only one instrument) will be equivalent in the LbD
model. The optimal policy is to choose the tax level τ t that minimises the present
value of abatement costs plus damage costs. This tax will in general be different from
the Pigouvian tax as the latter only reflects the shadow cost of emissions.
As the abatement firm sets the optimal level of abatement according to (20),
the optimal environmental tax level τ t follows from equalising equations (20) and
(47). Thus, we find:
τ t = θ t + ψη t H t /A t ,

(50)

where η t H t follows the development described by (48).
From (50) we can derive the following relationship between the environmental
tax and the Pigouvian tax:
τ t /θ t = 1 + ψη t H t /θ t A t .

(51)

As in the second-best R&D model, see (44), the environmental tax will always be
higher than the Pigouvian tax as long as abatement is positive. This result is in
accordance with Rosendahl (2004), who finds that the optimal tax rate should be
higher than the shadow cost of emissions when there are spillover effects from
learning by doing. We then have the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 7. In the LbD model, the efficient environmental tax, τt, will always be
higher than the Pigouvian tax, θt, as long as abatement is positive.
Comparing (44) with (51), we see that the development of the environmental tax
relative to the Pigouvian tax follows a similar pattern in the LbD model as in the R&D
model. This leads us to the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 8. In the LbD model, for a constantly maturing abatement sector, the
relative difference between the efficient environmental tax, τt, and the
Pigouvian tax, θt, will fall over time.
Proof. The proof follows exactly the same line of argument as Propositions 4 and 6.

4. MODEL EQUIVALENCE
As mentioned in the introduction, we expected the gap between an LbD model and a
second-best R&D model with finite patent’s lifetime to be considerably narrowed.
15
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This is partly confirmed by Propositions 6 and 8, which show that the R&D model
share similarities with the LbD model in the second-best optimum. To study this
further, we would like to see if equivalence between the two models can be shown to
hold more generally. If so, this would mean that the choice of knowledge dynamics
would not matter for policy implications, given the second-best setting.
To study the possible equivalence between the two models, we need to define
equivalence. Assume now that the social welfare program for the second-best R&D
model defined by (39), and the similar program for the LbD model defined by (46),
both give well defined paths for the abatement effort, A, efficient environmental tax, τ,
and the Pigouvian tax, θ. We define the two models to be equivalent if they give the
same outcomes of these three variables for the same environmental preferences
captured by D(S t ).
First, we would like the models to produce the same market equilibrium, i.e.,
the same abatement level for a given tax on emissions. Second, we would like the
second-best social optimum to be the same, which means that the efficient
environmental tax should be the same in both models. The second condition is
equivalent to the condition that the relative difference between the efficient tax and
the Pigouvian tax should be equal in the two models. The reason is that the Pigouvian
tax is equal across models as long as the abatement paths are equal (cf. (29) and (49)).
Thus, if (τ t )t is the efficient tax for one model, it produces the same abatement path
and hence the same Pigouvian tax path for both models. Therefore, if the ratio (τt/θt)t
is the same, (τ t )t is the efficient tax for the other model as well.
Based on these requirements, we can define equivalence in the second-best
setting if the R&D model and the LbD model
(i)
(ii)

produce the same abatement path, (A t )t, resulting from an arbitrary tax path,
(τ t )t (equivalence of the market equilibrium).
give the same ratio between the efficient and the Pigouvian tax (τt/θt)t for any
abatement path, (A t )t (equivalence of the social optimum).

Thus equivalence means that for any second-best R&D model, an LbD model can be
made that has exactly the same dynamic response function in the market equilibrium,
and produces exactly the same socially optimal tax and abatement paths (and vice
versa).
To continue, we need to set up both models on the same format. Consider,
therefore, the reduced form specifications of the market equilibrium for the secondbest R&D model and the LbD model, where the subscript R denotes the R&D model
and L denotes the LbD model.
Based on (5), (40), and (41), the reduced form specification for the R&D
model is:
α

γ

A R , t = B R ZR , t R H R , t R
Z R , t = G R τt A R , t

(52)
(53)

H R , t = K R ZR , t R H R , t –1 R,

(54)

ψ

1–ψ

2
βγ
ψ
where B R =B (β γ/α) , G R =α, K R =((1–β)βγ/α) , α R =α+βγ , γ R =(1–β)γ and
ψR =ψ.
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In the same way, we specify the reduced form of the LbD model based on
(18), (20) and (21):
α

γ

A L , t = B L ZL , t L H L , t L
Z L , t = G L τt A L , t

(55)
(56)

H L , t = AL , t L H L , t –1 L,

(57)

ψ

1–ψ

where B L =B, G L =α , α L =α , γ L =γ and ψL =ψ.
Both reduced form versions of the models have three parameters, α, γ and ψ,
which, as we will show, completely determine the dynamic behaviour of the model
and the optimality conditions.
To see if the reduced form models are equivalent, we first introduce three
intuitive requirements, which we use to derive relationships between the three
parameters in the two models. Then we use these relationships to prove equivalence
between the models.
The three requirements are that the short-term scale elasticities, the long-term
scale elasticities, and the discount factor of the value of knowledge should be equal
across models. Let us denote by μ the short-term returns to scale of production, i.e.,
μ=(dA t /dZ t )/(A t /Z t ) with fixed Ht–1. Let ν denote the long-term (steady state)
returns to scale of production, i.e., ν=(dA/dZ)/(A/Z), with H=Z for the R&D
model11 and H=A for the LbD model12. Let ρ be the discount factor of the value of
knowledge, i.e., the factor before η t + 1 H t + 1 in (43) and (48). We find that:
μR = αR + γRψR
νR = αR + γR
ρ R = δ(1–ψ R )

(58)
(59)
(60)

μ L = α L /(1–γ L ψ L )
ν L = α L /(1–γ L )
ρ L = δ(1–ψ L )/(1–γ L ψ L ).

(61)
(62)
(63)

Now, we can prove full dynamic equivalence of the market equilibrium between the
two models, cf. (i) in the definition of equivalence above.
PROPOSITION 9. The market equilibrium: When the second-best R&D model and the
LbD model have the same characteristics, μR=μL, νR=νL and ρR=ρL, and have
parameters BR, BL, GR, GL and KR, (in notation of (52)-(57)) and initial
knowledge stocks HR=H*R and HL=H*L that support the same steady state,
τ*R =τ*L and A*R =A*L, then the two models have exactly the same dynamic
behaviour. Formally, for given exogenous tax path (τ t )t, both models produce
the same equilibrium abatement path (A t )t.
Proof. See the Appendix.
11
12

This follows from inserting Ht=Ht-1 in equation (54).
This follows from inserting Ht=Ht-1 in equation (57).
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Whereas Proposition 9 states the dynamic equivalence of the market equilibrium
between the second-best R&D model and the LbD model, we also have to prove that
both models generate the same optimal policy, cf. (ii) in the definition of equivalence
above. The following proposition states the equivalence of the social optimum:
PROPOSITION 10. Social optimum: When the second-best R&D model and the LbD
model have the same characteristics, μR=μL, νR=νL and ρR=ρL, and follow the
same abatement path (A t )t for a given tax path (τ t )t, then both models have the
same ratio between the efficient and the Pigouvian tax (τt/θt)t. Thus, the R&D
and LbD models produce exactly identical optimal tax paths.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The two propositions together make the proposition of full equivalence between the
second-best R&D and the LbD model:
PROPOSITION 11. When the second-best R&D model and the LbD model have the same
characteristics, μR=μL, νR=νL and ρR=ρL, and have parameters and initial
stock levels that support the same steady state, the R&D and LbD models are
equivalent if only one policy instrument, i.e., a tax on emissions, is available.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Proposition 9 and10. Q.E.D.

5. SIMULATIONS
In this section we want to illustrate the theory by developing and simulating a
numerical model that mimics a transition from a fossil fuel based to a carbon free
energy system. The speed of transition is determined by technological progress,
driven by policies and market forces. The numerical model gives insight into
development over time of the relationship between the optimal environmental tax and
the Pigouvian tax in a situation where research policies are not available, cf.
Proposition 8. We will also use the model to get confirmation on equivalence between
the LbD model and the second-best R&D model, cf. Proposition 11.
Calibration
We set out to calibrate a model that reproduces key characteristics of the climate
change debate in a stylised manner. The starting point is a business as usual scenario
of a LbD model with the following characteristics:
(i) Global emissions of CO2 are 6 Gigatons carbon per year in the base year 2000.
(ii) Fossil fuel production costs grow (exogenously) from €200 per ton carbon in
2000 to €600 in 2200. €200 per ton carbon corresponds approximately to the
average international market price of fossil fuels in 2004 and 2005 (BP, 2006).
The rising unit costs over time reflect the exhaustion of easy-to-recover reserves.
(iii) CO2-free energy amounts to 0.5 per cent of fossil energy in the base year. This is
the share of commercial non-hydro, non-bio renewables in global energy supply
(see IEA, 2005). Moreover, the annual growth in CO2-free energy in 2000 is set
to 4.5 per cent, which is consistent with actual growth rates in the 1990's for those
renewables (cf. IEA, 2002, p. 27).
18
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(iv) The long-term returns to scale in CO2-free energy (ν) is 1.2. This is consistent
with an initial learning rate of 15-20 per cent, which is often seen in studies of
CO2-free energy (e.g., IEA, 2000).13
(v) CO2-free energy constitutes 50 per cent of total energy use in 2250 in a
benchmark BaU scenario. This benchmark scenario assumes that the spillover
effects from learning are internalised, but not the damages from CO2 emissions.
(vi) In the benchmark scenario, the marginal damages of CO2 emissions (the
equivalent of the Pigouvian tax on CO2 emissions if it were levied) in 2000 are
€100 per ton carbon, or €28 per ton CO2. As a comparison, the price of
allowances in the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme has hovered between €7 and
€30 per ton CO2 since the scheme was initiated in 2005. On the other hand, the
Stern Review (2007) suggests that the social cost of carbon today is around $85
per ton CO2, if the world continues on the BaU path, and $25-30 if the
concentration of CO2-equivalents is stabilised between 450-550 ppm CO2e.
Production of energy is modelled slightly differently in the simulation model
compared to the theoretical model (cf. equation (1)):

(

Y = E ( σ−1) / σ + A( σ−1) / σ

)

σ /( σ−1)

.

(64)

This CES-aggregate is used to give the simulation model more realism. It means that
CO2-free energy is an imperfect substitute to fossil fuels, so that the prices of fossil
and CO2-free energy may differ (whereas in the theoretical analyses abatement is a
perfect substitute for emissions with identical price). Still, we assume that both E and
A are measured in the same units. In energy system analysis, this would typically be
in primary energy equivalents (EJ), but for convenience of our presentation, we
present energy in Gigaton carbon equivalents, using the average carbon content of
fossil fuels for conversion. The substitution parameter σ is set to 2, which implies that
the price of A is 14 times higher than the price of E initially. Note that with σ=∞,
equation (64) reduces to equation (1).
In addition to the calibration data, the following assumptions are made. The
length of the simulation periods, and thus the lifetime of patents, is set to ten years.14
Future costs and benefits are discounted at a rate of 5 per cent per year. This is a
compromise between typical market rates and social discount rates used in e.g. Stern
Review (2007). Concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere above the pre-industrial level
decays by 1 per cent annually.15 Energy use per capita grows by 1 per cent per year,
whereas population grows by 1.2 per cent initially, but levels off at around 11 billion
people during the first century. Marginal damage costs grow with economic growth
per capita, for which we take 2 per cent per year. The assumptions about growth in
population, economy and energy use seem to be in between the A1 and the A2
γ/

γ/

In an initial steady state, we have Z/A = A(1/α)-1B-(1/α)H α=C·A(1/α)-1+ α, where C is a constant, and we
γ)/
have assumed fixed growth rate in abatement. The learning rate is then given by 1-2(1-α- α, which
varies between 0.13 and 0.24 when α varies between 0.5 and 1 (and ν=1.2).
14
Ten years may seem a bit short for the lifetime of patents. Note, however, that the main results
regarding the ratio of efficient tax over Pigouvian tax (cf. Figure 6) are quite similar when we e.g.
double the length of the simulation periods.
15
This is of course a simplification of the carbon cycle, i.e., the interaction between CO2 in the
atmosphere and CO2 in the land and in the ocean (see e.g. IPCC, 2001, Chapter 3.5). In particular, it
may overestimate the decay of CO2 when the concentration level gets higher.
13
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scenarios put forward by the IPCC's Special Report on Emission Scenarios (IPCC,
2000).
Table 1 shows the remaining (endogenous) model parameters in the LbD
model that agree with the calibration requirements above. The table also shows the
equivalent parameters in the second-best R&D model, which are calculated based on
the equations in Section 4.
TABLE 1. Parameters in LbD model and equivalent second-best R&D model
LbD model
R&D model
0.85
0.69
α
0.3
β
0.30
0.51
γ
0.19
0.14
ψ
Scenarios
We run four alternative scenarios, see Table 2. All scenarios have the same stock
levels in 2000, and environmental policy is introduced in 2010 in all scenarios except
S0 (the BaU scenario). S1 and S2 denote the first- and second-best R&D scenarios,
whereas the S3 scenario is based on a cost minimisation instead of a cost-benefit
optimisation. That is, the first-best R&D model is used to minimise:
∞

t

Min Σ 0 δ [Z t + R t + X t ],

(65)

with the additional constraint:
∞

t

∞

t

Σ 0 δ D(S t ) ≤ Σ 0 δ D(S *t ),

(66)

where S *t is the concentration level in the S2 solution. The purpose of introducing this
scenario is to examine the timing of abatement within a first- and second-best R&D
model, where the discounted environmental damage costs are equal.
TABLE 2. Model scenarios
Scenarios
Business as Usual (BaU)
S0
First-best R&D
S1
Second-best R&D (=LbD)
S2
First-best R&D with same damage as in S2
S3
Numerical results
First of all, the simulations clearly confirm Proposition 11, i.e., that the second-best
R&D model and the LbD model are equivalent. The models produce the same optimal
tax and abatement paths. Thus, the difference between the R&D and the LbD model
can be interpreted along the lines of differences in access to policy instruments, at
least within our model framework. Our conclusions about the S2 scenario therefore
relate to both the second-best R&D model and the LbD model.
Figures 1 and 2 show the development of fossil (Et) and CO2-free (At) energy
over the next two centuries, measured in Gigaton carbon per year (on a logarithmic
scale). In the policy scenarios, we see from Figure 1 that fossil energy reaches a top in
20
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the middle of this century, and falls below CO2-free energy just before 2100 (only
shown for S2). From Figure 2 we note that all policy scenarios produce very similar
energy paths. Differences between first-best and second-best scenarios are small
compared to overall policy effects. CO2-free energy rises more rapidly in the first-best
scenario (S1) than in the second-best scenario (S2), despite a higher environmental tax
in the latter scenario (see below). The reason for this is that a first-best policy can
stimulate abatement more cost-effectively through appropriate taxes and subsidies,
compared to a second-best policy that only can stimulate CO2-free energy through
taxes on fossil fuels. Costs of abatement are thus lower in scenario S1, compared to
S2.
In the cost-effective scenario (S3), CO2-free energy is initially used slightly
less than in the second-best policy scenario (S2), but catches up around 2040. The
smaller market share in scenario S3 in the beginning is due to the fact that innovation
for and deployment of CO2-free energy can be targeted separately by appropriate
subsidies or taxes. Thus, with all policy instruments available, R&D is shifted upfront,
whereas abatement is delayed.

Gigaton carbon per year

100.0

10.0

1.0
Fossil energy (S0)
0.1

CO2-free energy (S0)
Fossil energy (S2)
CO2-free energy (S2)

0.0
2000

2050

2100

2150

2200

FIGURE 1. Fossil and CO2-free energy in the S0 and S2 scenarios

Eq. Gigaton carbon per year

100.00

10.00

1.00
CO2-free energy (S0)
CO2-free energy (S1)

0.10

CO2-free energy (S2)
CO2-free energy (S3)

0.01
2000

2050

2100

2150

2200
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FIGURE 2. CO2 free energy in the different scenarios
The timing issue is better seen in Figure 3, which shows the annual growth rate in
CO2-free energy expenditures (i.e., growth in Zt+Xt). We notice that in all scenarios
the growth rate falls, that is, the abatement sector is maturing as defined above
Proposition 4. The transition from an infant industry into a matured industry is most
pronounced in the policy scenarios. Also, we notice that growth rates in the scenarios
S1 and S3 virtually coincide. Obviously, climate change policy increases abatement
growth substantially over the first century, but eventually, the CO2-free energy sector
matures around the middle of the next century, as it takes over the energy market
almost completely. From that time onwards, CO2-free energy expenditures grow at
the same rate as total energy use, i.e., by 1 per cent per year. When comparing the
first-best and second-best scenarios, we find that expenditures start at a lower level in
the first-best R&D model (S3), and grow slightly faster throughout the simulation
period compared to the second-best R&D model (S2).
0.06
S0
Annual rate of growh

0.05

S1
S2

0.04

S3
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.00
2000

2050

2100

2150

2200

FIGURE 3. Growth in CO2-free energy expenditures in the different scenarios

600
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350
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2000

2050

2100

2150
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FIGURE 4. Concentration level of CO2 in the different scenarios
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Though we apply only a simple one-box resource model, still it can produce
qualitative insights in the concentration level of CO2 in the atmosphere (St). The
concentration peaks around 2100 in the policy scenarios at a stock level equivalent to
about 475 ppmv. Under the first-best R&D policy, S1, more action is taken and thus
the concentration level peaks at a slightly lower level than with a second-best R&D
policy S2. The two scenarios with equal net present value of damages, S2 and S3, are
very similar.
In Figure 5 we show how the Pigouvian tax (θt) and the efficient tax (τ)
develop in the three policy scenarios. In the first-best R&D scenario (S1), these two
taxes are equal (cf. Proposition 3). In the second-best R&D scenario (S2) they are
generally not (cf. equation (44)), and in our numerical simulations the efficient tax is
well above the Pigouvian tax. The figure further shows that the Pigouvian tax is
higher in the second-best scenario (S2) and the cost-effective scenario (S3) than in the
first-best scenario (S1), which reflects the higher concentration level, and thus higher
marginal environmental damages, in these scenarios. Consequently, in the costeffectiveness scenario (S3), the efficient tax lies below the Pigouvian tax, as less
abatement is needed compared to the first-best (S1) (cost-benefit) scenario. Note that
in the cost-effective scenario, abatement levels are less than optimal (given the
environmental damage function), as the objective is to minimise abatement costs for a
fixed present value of future environmental damages (based on S2). Remember that
environmental damages are higher in S2 than in the first-best outcome S1. That is why
marginal abatement costs (τ t ) are below marginal damage costs (θt) in this scenario.
1400

Euro/ton carbon

1200
1000
800

Efficient=Pigouvian tax (S1)
Pigouvian tax (S2)
Efficient tax (S2)
Efficient tax (S3)

600
400
200
0
2000

2020

2040

2060

2080

2100

FIGURE 5. Efficient tax and Pigouvian tax in the different scenarios
The ratio between the efficient and the Pigouvian taxes in the second-best scenario S2
is displayed in Figure 6, showing that the ratio exceeds unity and is falling
monotonically over time. This confirms Proposition 5 and Proposition 6. The latter
proposition states that the relative difference between the efficient and the Pigouvian
tax will fall over time in the case with a maturing abatement sector (see Figure 3). We
notice that the initial tax in this scenario exceeds the Pigouvian tax by factor 2.
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2
1.9
Tau over theta (S2)

1.8
1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1
2000

2050

2100

2150

2200

FIGURE 6. Ratio of Efficient tax over Pigouvian tax in second-best R&D
scenario

6. CONCLUSION
In the climate change literature a pressing question is whether currently it is sufficient
to stimulate the development of clean technologies for future use (technology push),
or alternatively, that we need to start emission abatement sooner rather than later.
Some take the technology push perspective even one step further, and assume that the
foresight of a future need for abatement is sufficient to lead private firms to develop
clean technologies. Within this optimistic perspective, it is unwarranted to start with
abatement activities too hastily, as these early abatement efforts are unnecessarily
costly compared to the cheaper options that will become available in the future. In the
literature on technology development and climate change, the proponents of delayed
and early action have often been divided along the lines of users of R&D models
versus users of LbD models. Our analysis suggests that this distinction in perspective
arising from the two types of models is not justified (Proposition 11).
If the public authority can directly steer the development of environmental
technology, either through public environmental R&D or through targeted private
environmental R&D, then it is efficient to spend much of the initial effort on this
technological development. In both cases it is to be noted that in the phase of an
emerging environmental problem, substantial public funds are to be directed to
developing environmentally friendly technologies, either through public R&D or
through high subsidies on private R&D (Proposition 4).
However, if the public authority cannot directly determine the development of
an environmentally friendly technology, then efficiency considerations suggest that
the clean technology should be extra stimulated through an increased demand for its
produced goods. The technology pull policy should be relatively strong during the
emerging phase of the environmental problem, when the abatement technologies still
have to mature. Notably, this result is found in both the R&D and the LbD model
(Proposition 6, Proposition 8). The major feature responsible for this equivalence
between the R&D and the LbD models is an assumed finite lifetime of patents in the
R&D model, a credible assumption we think.
As a final comment, we notice that the theoretical analysis we carried out has
been fairly general, so that our findings may imply more generally that infant
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industries should be stimulated to a larger degree than mature industries. This topic
may be worked out in future research.

APPENDIX
For the proofs of Proposition 9 and Proposition 10, we have to do some preliminary
work. Assume that μ R =μ L =μ, ν R =ν L =ν and ρ R =ρ L =ρ. We can then invert the
equations (58)-(63), which enables us to calculate the parameters α R , γ R , ψ R and α L ,
γ L , ψ L as functions of μ, ν and ρ:
α R = ν(1–δ/ρ)+μδ/ρ
γ R = (ν–μ)δ/ρ
ψ R = 1–δ/ρ
α L = ν(1–δ/ρ)+μδ/ρ
γ L = (1–μ/ν)δ/ρ
ψ L = (1–δ/ρ)ν/μ.

(67)
(68)
(69)
(70)
(71)
(72)

It follows that when the two models have the same characteristics μ, ν and ρ, then the
following relations hold between the two sets of model parameters:
αR = αL
γR = ν γL
ψ R = (μ/ν) ψ L or (1–ψ R ) = (μ/α L )(1–ψ L ).

(73)
(74)
(75)

Proof of Proposition 9: Let us denote by a tilde on top of a variable the log-difference
~
compared to the steady state, e.g., τt=ln(τt)–ln(τ*). Since (52)-(57) hold in steady state,
we can now log-linearize them:
~

~

~

A R , t = α R ZR , t + γ R H R , t
~

Z R , t = τt + A R , t
~

(76)

~

~

(77)

~

~

HR , t = ψ R ZR , t + (1–ψ R )HR,t–1.

(78)

Similarly, for the LbD model, we take the log-linearization
~

~

~

AL , t = α L ZL , t + γ L HL , t
~

~

Z L , t = τt + A L , t
~

(79)

~

(80)

~

~

HL , t = ψ L AL , t + (1–ψ L )HL,t–1.

(81)
~

For the R&D model, substituting ZR , t out of (76)-(78), we derive
~

~

~

~

A R , t = α R τt + α R A R , t + γ R H R , t
~

~

~

(82)
~

HR , t = ψ R τt + ψ R AR , t + (1–ψ R )HR,t–1.

(83)
25

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper40

26

Gerlagh et al.: Optimal Timing of Environmental Policy; Interaction Between

OPTIMAL TIMING OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Substituting (83) in (82) and using (58) we derive
~

~

~

AR , t = [μ/(1–μ)] τt + [γ R (1–ψ R )/(1–μ)]HR , t–1.

(84)

~

Further, deriving τt from (82), substituting in (83) and using (58), we find
~

~

~

HR , t = [ψ R /μ]AR , t + (1–ψ R )[1–γ R ψ R /μ]HR , t–1.

(85)

And similarly, for the LbD model we derive
~

~

~

AL , t = [μ/(1–μ)] τt + [γ L (1–ψ L )μ/α L (1–μ)]HL , t–1

(86)

HL , t = ψ L AL , t + (1–ψ L ) HL , t–1.

(87)

~

~

~

~

~

Evaluating the equations for the first period t=1, we have HR , 0 =HL , 0 =0 as we assume
~

~

an initial steady state, and thus AR , 1 =AL 1 from (84) and (86). Also, from (85),(87) and
~

~

(75), we find HR , 1/HL , 1=ψ R /μψ L =1/ν. By forward induction, we can show that
~

~

~

~

AR , t=AL , t and HR , t /HL , t =1/ν for all t. Assume that the equalities hold for t (and they
do for t=1). Then, for t+1 it follows from (73), (74) and (75) that
γ R (1–ψ R )/(1–μ) = ν[γ L (1–ψ L )μ/α L (1–μ)].

(88)

If we substitute this equality in (84) and (86), we find
~

~

AR , t+1 = AL , t+1.
Furthermore, it follows from (58) and (75) that
(1–ψ R )[1–γ R ψ R /μ] = (1–ψ L ),

(89)
~

~

which, after substitution in (85) and (87), yields HR , t + 1/HL , t + 1=1/ν.
~

~

To conclude, for all t we have established that AR , t=AL , t and consequently, AR , t=AL , t as
we assume that A*R =A*L . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10: The optimal policy is determined by (43) and (44) for the
R&D model and by (48) and (51) for the LbD model. Rewriting (43) and (44), using
(60) and the parameter adjustments immediately below equation (54), we find for the
R&D model:
ηtHt = ρRηt+1Ht+1 + γRθtAt
τ t /θ t = 1 + ψ R /α R η t H t /θ t A t .

(90)
(91)
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In the same way we can rewrite the optimal policy conditions for the LbD model:
η t H t = ρ L η t + 1 H t + 1 + [γ L /(1–ψ L γ L )]θ t A t
τ t /θ t = 1 + ψ L η t H t /θ t A t .

(92)
(93)

Now, using (90), (91) can be rewritten as
2

τ t /θ t = 1 + [ψ R γ R /α R ](1+ρ R θ t + 1 A t + 1 /θ t A t +(ρ R ) θ t + 2 A t + 2 /θ t A t +…).

(94)

Also, using (92), (93) can be rewritten as
2

τ t /θ t =1+[ψ L γ L /(1–ψ L γ L )](1+ρ L θ t + 1 A t + 1 /θ t A t +(ρ L ) θ t + 2 A t + 2 /θ t A t +..).

(95)

Assume that τ t is the efficient tax in one of the models. Then we know from
Proposition 9 that it produces the same abatement path At, and hence the same
Pigouvian tax θ t in both models. Furthermore, we have by assumption ρR=ρL.
Therefore, in order to prove that τ t is the efficient tax in the other model as well, we
only need to prove that
ψ R γ R /α R =ψ L γ L /(1–ψ L γ L ).

(96)

Using (58) for the left-hand side and (61) for the right-hand side, (96) can be rewritten
as
μ R /α R –1 = μ L /α L –1,

(97)

which holds by assumption, see (73). Thus, we have established that the paths for the
efficient tax τ t are identical for the R&D and LbD models. Q.E.D.
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